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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of the heterogeneity of the labor
force on the spatial distribution of activities. This goal is achieved by
applying the tools of discrete choice theory to an economic geography
model. We show that taste heterogeneity acts as a strong dispersion
force. We also show that the relationship between the spatial distribu-
tion of the industry (the wage diﬀerential) and trade costs is smooth
and ∩-shaped. Finally, while Rawlsian equity leads to the disper-
sion of industry, our analysis reveals that eﬃciency leads to a solution
close to the market outcome, although the latter is likely to involve
too much agglomeration compared to the former.
1 Introduction
Ever since the work of Krugman (1991), there has been a growing litera-
ture stressing the fact that the secular decline in trade costs (Bairoch, 1988),
broadly deﬁned to include all impediments to the exchange of goods, favors
the emergence of a core-periphery structure in which all manufacturing ﬁrms
would be geographically concentrated (see, e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Ven-
ables, 1999, for an extensive overview). Yet, this result has been criticized
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1by many because the setting used in this literature suﬀers from several se-
vere limitations that cast doubt on the predictive power of the model. More
precisely, by ignoring most of the costs imposed by space, the core-periphery
model would remain in the tradition of international trade theory and, thus,
would fail to provide an accurate description of the working of a spatial
economy.
This state of aﬀairs has led to several extensions. Some of them are re-
viewed in Ottaviano and Puga (1998), while Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse
(2001) use an alternative model allowing for the study of a broader set of
issues. However, one critical assumption common to all existing models of
economic geography is that individuals have the same preferences. Although
this assumption is not uncommon in economic modeling, it seems highly im-
plausible that all potentially mobile individuals will react in the same way
to a given “gap” between regions. First of all, it is well known that some
people show a high degree of attachment to the region where they are born.
They will stay put even though they may guarantee to themselves higher
living standards in other places. In the same spirit, life-time considerations
such as marriage, divorce and the like play an important role in the decision
to migrate (Greenwood, 1985). Second, regions are not similar and exhibit
diﬀerent natural and cultural features. Clearly, people value diﬀerently local
amenities and such diﬀerences in attitudes are known to aﬀect the migration
process (Roback, 1982). The simple recognition that individuals are het-
erogenous in their perception of regional diﬀerences is, therefore, suﬃcient
to invite us to revisit the core-periphery model.
Although the standard assumption of a priori identical regions is conve-
nient to isolate the pure eﬀects generated by the interplay between the ag-
glomeration and dispersion forces, it does not permit us to study the impact of
diﬀerential amenities. This is our second modiﬁcation of the core-periphery
model: amenity levels need not be the same across regions. Indeed, our model
allows for a simple determination of the market outcome even when regions
have diﬀerent amenities. In such a context, both the market outcome and
the optimum are asymmetric and it is worthwhile exploring their diﬀerence.
To sumup, we consider a setting in which potentially mobile workers
may choose to stay put because of extraneous considerations. These consid-
erations are fundamental ingredients of the migration decision and should be
accounted for explicitly in workers’ preferences. Even though the personal
motivations may be quite diverse and, therefore, diﬃcult to model at the
individual level, Miyao (1978), Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou and Thisse (1985)
2and Tabuchi (1986) have argued that it is possible to identify their aggregate
impact on the spatial distribution of economic activities by using discrete
choice theory. Speciﬁcally, we assume in this paper that the “matching”
of mobile workers’ with regions is expressed through the binary logit (Mc-
Fadden, 1974).1 This assumption turns out to be empirically relevant in
migration modeling (see, e.g. Anderson and Papageorgiou, 1994), while it is
analytically convenient without aﬀecting the qualitative nature of our main
results.2 Finally, regions need not be a priori identical in terms of amenities.
Yet, as will be seen, it will be useful to consider the case of symmetric regions
because it yields very neat results.
Previewing our main results, we show that taste heterogeneity is a strong
dispersion force that drastically aﬀects the conclusions inferred fromthe core-
periphery model. More precisely, as trade costs steadily decrease to zero, the
equilibriumconﬁguration typically involves, ﬁrst, dispersion, then partial ag-
glomeration and, last re-dispersion. In other words, the relationship between
the spatial distribution of the industry and trade costs is ∩-shaped. Fur-
thermore, we will see that the more heterogenous the population of mobile
workers, the more likely the dispersed conﬁguration. In particular, even when
agglomeration occurs, it involves a weaker degree of concentration of ﬁrms
and workers than the core-periphery model, while the agglomeration process
is gradual instead of exhibiting a bang-bang behavior. All these results strike
us as being more plausible than existing ones and show how heterogeneity in
workers’ attitudes toward migrations have a profound impact on the spatial
distribution of industry and, therefore, on the nature of trade. Still, our
model yields the usual core-periphery structure, but only in the limiting case
in which mobile workers are homogenous. At the other extreme, dispersion
is the only market outcome when heterogeneity among workers is strong. Fi-
nally, our welfare analysis reveals that the eﬃcient conﬁguration displays a
pattern similar to that of the market equilibrium, although both excessive or
insuﬃcient agglomeration may arise. However, the general trend looks like
1The logit model has already been used by Anas (1990) to model residential choice
within a city.
2It is worth noting that this modeling strategy provides us with a ﬁrst reconciliation
between economic geography and spatial interaction theory. Although this branch of
regional science was relegated by Krugman (1995) in the “ﬁve lost traditions” of economic
geography, it is our contention that it remains a lively and promising research domain.
Thus, connecting the two ﬁelds is likely to be relevant from both the theoretical and
empirical points of view.
3too much agglomeration in equilibrium.
We ﬁnd these results especially relevant for the following reason. Once
individual welfare level gets suﬃciently high through the steadily increase of
income, workers tend to pay more attention to the non-market attributes of
their environment (see also Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz, 2001). Typically, they
exhibit idiosyncratic tastes about such attributes. In this context, our results
suggest that the spatial pattern of production in post-industrial societies
might well diﬀer from what it has been in the industrial societies we have
known (Geyer and Kontuly, 1996; MacKellar and Vining, 1995). We return
to this important topic in the concluding section.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The model is pre-
sented in the subsequent section. The market outcome, with asymmetric
and symmetric regions, is analyzed in Section 3. Interregional diﬀerential in
nominal wages are examined in relation to the empirical literature in Section
4. The comparison between the equilibrium outcome and the ﬁrst best op-
timum is conducted in Section 5 for the cases of asymmetric and symmetric
regions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The economic space is made of two regions, denoted H and F. There are two
factors, denoted A and L. Factor A is evenly distributed across regions and is
spatially immobile. Factor L is mobile between the two regions and λ ∈ [0,1]
denotes the share of this factor located in region H. For expositional pur-
poses, we refer to sector A as ‘agriculture’ and sector L as ‘manufacturing’.
Accordingly, we call ‘farmers’ the immobile factor A and ‘workers’ the mobile
factor L.3 There are two goods in the economy. The ﬁrst good is homoge-
nous. Consumers have a positive initial endowment of this good which is also
produced using factor A as the only input under constant returns to scale
and perfect competition. This good can be traded freely between regions and
is chosen as the num´ eraire. The other good is a horizontally diﬀerentiated
product; it is supplied by using L as the only input under increasing returns
to scale and monopolistic competition.
3The reader who ﬁnds this interpretation nowadays irrelevant may think of the economy
as being formed by a modern sector and a traditional sector, using respectively high-skilled
and low-skilled workers.
4Preferences about the diﬀerentiated product and the num´ eraire are iden-
tical across individuals. They are described by a quasi-linear utility with a
quadratic subutility symmetric in all varieties:


















where q(i) is the quantity of variety i ∈ [0,N] and q0 the quantity of the
num´ eraire. The parameters are such that α>0 and β>γ>0. In (1), α
expresses the intensity of preference for the diﬀerentiated product, whereas
β>γmeans that consumers have a love of variety. Finally, for a given value
of β, the parameter γ expresses the substitutability between varieties: the
higher γ, the closer substitutes the varieties. We use a quasi-linear utility
that abstracts fromgeneral equilibriumincom e eﬀects for analytical conve-
nience. Although this modeling strategy gives our framework a fairly strong
partial equilibriumﬂavor, it does not rem ove the interaction between prod-
uct and labor markets, thus allowing us to develop a full-ﬂedged model of
agglomeration formation, independently of the relative size of the industrial
sector.
Any worker is endowed with one unit of labor and q0 > 0 units of the
num´ eraire. Her budget constraint can then be written as follows:
 N
0
p(i)q(i)di + q0 = w + q0
where w is the worker’s wage and p(i) the price of variety i. The initial endow-
ment q0 is supposed to be suﬃciently large for the equilibriumconsum ption
of the num´ eraire to be positive for each individual. This assumption allows
us to focus on interior solutions only and is consistent with the idea that
each worker is interested in consuming both types of goods.
Turning to the supply side, technology in agriculture requires one unit of
A in order to produce one unit of output. With free trade in agriculture, the
choice of this good as the num´ eraire implies that in equilibrium the wage of
the farmers is equal to one in both regions, that is, wA
H = wA
F = 1. Technology
in manufacturing requires φ units of L in order to produce any amount of
a variety, i.e. the marginal cost of production of a variety is set equal to
5zero. This simplifying assumption, which is standard in many models of
industrial organization, entails no loss of generality when ﬁrms’ marginal
costs are incurred in the num´ eraire. We assume that there is continuum N
of potential ﬁrms and denote by λr the fraction of workers (L) living in region
r, with λH + λF =1 .
There are no scope economies so that, due to increasing returns to scale,
there is a one-to-one relationship between ﬁrms and varieties. Each variety
can be traded at a positive cost of τ units of the num´ eraire for each unit
transported fromone region to the other, regardless of the variety, where τ
accounts for all the impediments to trade. Since each ﬁrm sells a diﬀerenti-
ated variety, it faces a downward sloping demand. Each ﬁrm has a negligible
impact on the market outcome in the sense that it can ignore its inﬂuence
on, and hence reactions from, other ﬁrms. However, aggregate market con-
ditions of some kind (here average price across ﬁrms) aﬀects any single ﬁrm.
This provides a setting in which individual ﬁrms are not competitive (in the
classic economic sense of having inﬁnite demand elasticity) but, at the same
time, they have no strategic interactions with one another. The demand for




[p(j) − p(i)]dj (2)






which can be interpreted as the price index in the modern sector, while
a ≡ α/[(β+(N −1)γ], b ≡ 1/[β+(N −1)γ] and c ≡ γ/(β−γ)[β+(N −1)γ].
The indirect utility corresponding to the demand system (2) is as follows:
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so that the total number of ﬁrms in the economy is N =1 /φ. Since workers
and ﬁrms move together, immigrants do not displace native workers but
start new businesses and create jobs for the region. As in Krugman (1991),
however, the model allows for the endogenous determination of the spatial
distribution of the industry but not for its total size.
In accordance with empirical observations, we assume that each ﬁrm is
able to set a price speciﬁc to the market in which its product is sold, that is,
markets are segmented (Greenhut 1981; Head and Mayer, 2000; McCallum,
1995). Hence, the proﬁts made by a ﬁrm in region r = H,F are deﬁned as
follows:
Πr = prrqrr(prr)(A/2+λrL)+( prs − τ)qrs(prs)(A/2+λsL) − φwr
where wr stands for the wage prevailing in region r.
Each ﬁrm i in region r maximizes its proﬁt Πr, assuming accurately that







psr(i)di s  = r
Since, by symmetry, the prices selected by the ﬁrms located within the same

























s  = r (5)
For these prices to be meaningful, trade of varieties must be proﬁtable to
both ﬁrms and consumers. In other words, it must be that τ does not exceed




Finally, entry and exit are free so that proﬁts are zero in equilibrium.
Hence, (3) implies that any change in the population of workers located in
one region must be accompanied by a corresponding change in the number of
ﬁrms. The equilibrium wage w∗
r of the workers living in region r is obtained
fromthe zero proﬁt condition evaluated at the equilibriumprices (4) and (5):
w
∗
r =[ ( b + cN)(p
∗
rr)




3 Agglomeration or dispersion under heteroge-
nous tastes
Workers are free to live in either region. However, as discussed in the in-
troduction, they are heterogenous in their perception of the attributes and
characteristics associated with a particular region, while they are aﬀected
by diﬀerent sorts of extraneous considerations. Such personal variations in
tastes being unobservable, discrete choice theory suggests to model individual
idiosyncrasies by assuming that the actual matching value between a worker
and region r = H,F is the realization of a randomvariable εr (Anderson,
de Palma and Thisse, 1992, ch.3). In what follows, we assume that the εr
are identically and independently distributed across individuals according to
the double exponential with zero mean and a variance equal to π2µ2/6. As-
suming that the εr are i.i.d. implies that choices are governed by the same
probability distribution whereas tastes are stochastically uncorrelated. How-
ever, actual choices may diﬀer across workers. The fact that the distribution
is the double exponential involves little restriction in the case of two regions,
while allowing for simple and neat expressions.
Fromnow on, it is convenient to set λH ≡ λ and λF ≡ 1 − λ. Let
Vr(λ) be the indirect utility associated with the diﬀerentiated product and
the num´ eraire in region r. Then, the probability that a worker will choose to





8In (6), µ expresses the dispersion of individual tastes: the larger µ, the more
heterogenous the workers’ tastes about their living place. When µ =0 ,
workers are homogenous and behave as in Ottaviano et al. (2001).
Assume also that all workers agree that region H has a higher level of
amenities (dH) than region F (dF). Without loss of generality, we assume
that the amenity diﬀerential between the two regions is such that:
d ≡ dH − dF ≥ 0
For reasons that will become clear later on, H (F) is called the large (small)
region.
We know fromOttaviano et al. that Vr(λ) is a parabola whose quadratic
term is the same for both regions. As a consequence, after some tedious
calculations, we obtain
∆V (λ) ≡ VH(λ) − VF(λ)=C
∗τ(τ
∗ − τ)(λ − 1/2) + d
in which
C
∗ ≡ [2bφ(3bφ +3 cL + cA)+c
2L(A + L)]
L(bφ + cL)




2bφ(3bφ +3 cL + cA)+c2L(A + L)
> 0
In what follows, we assume that τtrade >τ ∗ in order to be able to describe
a complete agglomeration process. This amounts to assuming
A/L >
6b2φ2 +8 bcφL +3 c2L2
cL(2bφ + cL)
> 3 (7)
where the second inequality holds because b/c = β/γ − 1 ∈ (0,+∞). In-
deed, when (7) does not hold, the population of workers gets more and more
dispersed as trade costs keep decreasing, as in Helpman (1998), so that no
agglomeration occurs.
In the present setting, it should be clear that the population of workers
changes according to the following equation of motion:
dλ
dt
=( 1− λ)PH(λ) − λPF(λ) (8)
9where the ﬁrst termin the RHS of (8) stands for the fraction of people
migrating into region H, while the second termrepresents those leaving this
region for region F.
A spatial equilibrium λ∗ arises when dλ/dt = 0. Since the denominator
is the same in both Pr(λ), dλ/dt = 0 is equivalent to (1−λ)exp[VH(λ)/µ]=
λexp[VF(λ)/µ]. Taking the logarithmof both sides, we m ay rewrite the equi-
libriumcondition associated with (8) as follows:















As a result, since sgn(dλ/dt) = sgn[J(λ;τ)], the stability condition of the
system(8) is equivalent to
∂J(λ
∗;τ)/∂λ < 0










has two solutions with respect to λ. When both of themare real, denote the












Assume that J( λ(τ∗/2);τ∗/2) ≤ 0 holds. Since J( λ(τ);τ) can be shown
to be increasing (decreasing) in τ for τ>τ ∗/2( τ<τ ∗/2), and since







b ] = 0 with 0 <τ ∗
a ≤ τ∗/2 ≤ τ∗
b <τ ∗.
The following result whose proof of which is given in appendix will be
useful in characterizing the evolution of stable equilibria when τ decreases.








∗/2) < 0 (11)
does not hold, there exists a unique stable equilibrium belonging to (1/2,1).
(ii) If both (10) and (11) hold, the outcome is as follows: if τ>τ ∗
b or
τ<τ ∗
a, then there exists a unique stable equilibrium belonging to (1/2,1);i f
τ∗
a <τ<τ ∗
b there exist two stable equilibria, one belonging to (0,1/2) and
the other to (1/2,1).
In accordance with intuition, this lemma says that the region with the
higher amenity level (i.e. region H) is usually the region with the larger
industrial share. However, the region with the lower amenity level may also
end up the larger industrial share. This multiplicity of equilibria arises when
(i) trade costs take intermediate values (τ∗
a <τ<τ ∗
b ) and (ii) both the de-
gree of heterogeneity and the amenity diﬀerential are suﬃciently small for
the two regions not to be much diﬀerentiated in the workers’ eyes. As in the
homogenous case (µ = 0), when trade are not high, agglomeration may arise
in either region under weak heterogeneity (by a continuity argument). Nev-
ertheless, when trade costs are suﬃciently low, the existence of an amenity
diﬀerential suﬃces to prevent an equilibriumto occur in the region endowed
with low amenities. Finally, a low amenity diﬀerential means that both re-
gions are close to being symmetric. All these results are illustrated in Figure
1, where the heavy curves describe the stable equilibria and the broken line
the unstable equilibria.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Insofar as local stability is satisﬁed, the initially larger region H is always
larger throughout the process of falling trade costs.
Proposition 1 Consider two asymmetric regions (d>0) and assume that
the initial size of region H exceeds that of region F. Then, the size of region
11H is always larger than that of region F for any continuous decreases in trade
costs. When τ steadily decreases, the size of region H grows for τ>τ ∗/2
and declines for τ<τ ∗/2.
Proof. We know from Lemma 1 that there exists exactly one equilibrium
λ∗(τ) in the interval (1/2,1) for any τ ∈ [0,τ trade]. Since λ =1 /2 is never an
equilibriumand since λ∗(τ) changes continuously with τ, λ∗(τ) is always in
(1/2,1).


























since ∂J(λ∗,τ)/∂λ is always negative at any stable equilibrium. 
As long as µ is positive, the existence of a stable equilibriumsuch as
1/2 <λ ∗ < 1 implies that the advantage in amenities matters and is re-
ﬂected by the fact that the corresponding region is always larger than the
other. Furthermore, workers and ﬁrms never fully agglomerate within a sin-
gle region. Hence, even a low degree of heterogeneity is suﬃcient to prevent
the emergence of a standard core-periphery structure. Among other things,
this implies the existence of intraindustry trade between the two regions,
but ﬂows are unequal since more ﬁrms are located in region H. In addi-
tion, λ∗ does not exhibit any ﬂat spot so that the change in size of the large
(small) region is smooth and ∩-shaped (∪-shaped). Thus, when workers are
heterogenous, the economy does not exhibit any catastrophic change such as
those shown within the standard core-periphery model.








where the equality holds when d = 0. Moreover, it is readily veriﬁed that if




12implying that the degree of agglomeration takes its lowest value when trade









Consequently, the regional size diﬀerential gets narrower as the degree of het-
erogeneity is higher and the number of workers larger, while the asymmetry
in trading the diﬀerentiated product varies with the industrial share of region
H. The former inequality can be explained as follows: more heterogeneity
within workers means that prices, variety and wage matter less to them, thus
fostering more dispersion since workers’ matching values are drawn indepen-
dently from the same distribution. In the limiting case where µ →∞ ,w e
always have full dispersion because workers are willing to choose their place
according to a ﬁfty-ﬁfty randomchoice rule. Stated diﬀerently, heterogene-
ity always beneﬁts the region with the larger endowment, but simultaneously
prevents this region from accommodating all workers. The latter inequality
reﬂects the following idea: the larger the mass of workers within the economy,
the more important their location for their well-being. Hence, as expected,
the large region is larger when the mass of workers increases.
3.2 The case of symmetric regions
The case of symmetric regions leads to very neat results and is, therefore,
worth considering. Clearly, symmetry (λ∗ =1 /2) is always a steady-state for
(8) since J(1/2;τ) = 0. From(18), J(λ;τ) is convex (concave) with respect
to λ for all λ ∈ (0,1/2) (λ ∈ (1/2,1)), implying that there exists at most one
asymmetric equilibrium (up to a permutation).
Computing ∂J(λ;τ)/∂λ, we obtain
C
∗τ(τ




Hence, for a given admissible value of τ, the symmetric equilibrium is stable
(unstable) if and only if the heterogeneity in tastes is suﬃciently strong
(weak). When µ = 0, (12) implies that there is full dispersion when τ exceeds
τ∗, while there is full agglomeration when τ is lower than τ∗. In other words,
we get the standard core-periphery model when workers are homogenous.
13Solving the quadratic equation C∗τ(τ∗ − τ) − 4µ = 0 with respect to
τ, we are able to determine the symmetry breaking threshold as follows.
When µ = µ∗, the discriminant of this equation equals zero. Accordingly,
if the heterogeneity is small in that µ<µ ∗, then the quadratic equation



















2 <τ ∗ <τ trade.W e
thus have the following result.
Lemma 2 In the case of two symmetric regions (d =0 ), there exists a
unique stable equilibrium (up to a permutation). It involves dispersion when
τ ≥ τ∗
2 or τ ≤ τ∗
1 and partial agglomeration when τ∗
1 <τ<τ ∗
2.
This lemma implies that, in the intervals [0,τ∗
1] and [τ∗
2,τ trade], workers
are dispersed when µ>0, whereas they would be agglomerated in the case
of a homogenous population (µ = 0) because τ∗
1 = 0 and τ∗
2 = τ∗. Thus,
symmetry is more likely to occur when workers are heterogenous in their
regional matching.
We now describe how the stable equilibriumchanges with the level of
trade costs.
Proposition 2 Consider two symmetric regions (d =0 ) and let the trade
costs to decrease steadily.
(i) Assume that 0 <µ<µ ∗. When τ ≥ τ∗
2, the economy involves full
dispersion of the industry. When τ∗
2 >τ>τ ∗
1, partial agglomeration of the
industry arises. For τ∗
2 >τ>τ ∗/2 the gap between the two regions widens,
but narrows for τ∗/2 >τ>τ ∗
1. Finally, when τ ≤ τ∗
1, the industry is again
fully dispersed.
(ii) Assume that µ ≥ µ∗. Then, the industry is fully dispersed for all
admissible τ.
When heterogeneity µ is weak, the industry displays a three-stage pattern:
dispersion, partial agglomeration, and re-dispersion, as shown in Figure 2.
By contrast, when µ is large enough, there is always dispersion. This is
already enough to show that taste heterogeneity is a strong dispersion force.
But we can say more. It is readily veriﬁed that ∂τ∗
1/∂µ> 0 and ∂τ∗
2/∂µ< 0.
14Hence, a higher degree of heterogeneity implies that the symmetry breaking
threshold τ∗
1 (τ∗
2) arises at a higher (lower) value of trade costs, thus implying
that the domain for which partial agglomeration arises shrinks.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Case (i) in Proposition 2 shows the existence of a ∩-shaped relationship
between the regional concentration of the industry and the level of trade
costs. Such a relationship has already been obtained by Fujita et al. (1999,
ch.7) and Ottaviano et al. (2001) but in diﬀerent contexts so that it is worth
comparing results. In the former case, the agglomeration of the manufactur-
ing sector within, say, region H generates large imports of the agricultural
good fromregion F. When transport costs in the manufacturing sector be-
comes suﬃciently low, the price indices of this good is about the same in the
two regions. Then, the relative price of the agricultural good in H rises as its
transport cost remains unchanged. This in turn lowers region F’s nominal
wage that guarantees the same utility level in both regions to the workers.
When the transport costs within the manufacturing sector decrease suﬃ-
ciently, the factor price diﬀerential becomes strong enough to induce ﬁrms to
move away from H to F. In other words, as transport costs in the manufac-
turing sector keep decreasing fromhigh to very low values while transport
costs in the agricultural sector remain constant, the manufacturing sector is
ﬁrst fully dispersed, then fully agglomerated and, last, re-dispersed.
In the latter, it is assumed that the concentration of ﬁrms and workers
within a region takes place within a monocentric city: ﬁrms are located at the
city center, while workers are dispersed around this center. In this context,
workers also consume land (the lot size is supposed to be ﬁxed and equal
across workers, and the land rents go to absentee landlords) and commute
to the city center where they work. If θ denotes the unit commuting cost,
whether dispersion or agglomeration arises is determined by the sign of the
expression C∗τ(τ∗−τ)−θL/2 (compare this expression and (12)). Hence, the
existence of commuting costs leads to re-dispersion for suﬃciently low values
of τ. By contrast, it is the sign of C∗τ(τ∗−τ)−4µ that matters in the present
model. When µ is suﬃciently large, full dispersion arises because, trade costs
being low enough, the matching of workers with a particular region matters
more than anything else.
Replacing a, b and c by their values, we also see that µ∗ = 0 when there
is no increasing returns (φ = 0) as in Ottaviano et al. (2001). Thus, here
also, we need increasing returns in order to trigger an agglomeration process.
154 Interregional wage diﬀerential






(bφ + cL)[2bφ + c(A + L)]L
2φ2 (2bφ + cL)
τ(τ
o − τ)(λ





2bφ + c(A + L)
The amenity diﬀerential d does not directly appear in (13). However, since







holds, then the nominal wage in the large region is lower (higher) than in the
small one for τ>τ o (τ<τ o). This leads to the following sequence. (i) When
τ ∈ (τo,τ trade), the large region attracts workers although wages are higher
in the small region; (ii) when τ ∈ (τ∗/2,τo), the large region still attracts
workers, a result which seems more intuitive because wages are now higher
in region H; (iii) when τ ∈ (0,τ∗/2), one gets an unexpected result because
the large region lose workers although wages in H are higher than in the
small region, which now accommodates more workers. Such counter-intuitive
ﬂows have often been observed in the real world (Vining and Kontuly, 1978).
However, they should not come as a real surprise since what drives migration
is the utility diﬀerential and not the wage diﬀerential, which is just one part
of the former. This also shows how misleading might be the comparison of
regional living standards based on average incomes only.
Let us now focus on the nominal wage diﬀerential (13). We know from
the RHS of (13) that the term τ(τo−τ) is increasing (decreasing) in τ<τ o/2
(τ>τ o/2), while (λ∗−1/2) is increasing (decreasing) in τ<τ ∗/2( τ>τ ∗/2)
fromProposition 1. Since τo/2 <τ ∗/2 <τ trade holds, we may conclude that
for τ ∈ (τo/2,τ∗/2), when trade costs τ decrease over time, the interregional
nominal wage diﬀerential, ﬁrst, increases for large values of τ and, then,
decreases for small values of τ.
16This last result sheds some light on an old debate dealing with the spatial
implications of economic development. In the development literature, a high
degree of urban concentration together with a widening wage diﬀerential is
expected to arise during the early phases of economic growth; as development
proceeds, spatial deconcentration and a narrowing wage diﬀerential should
occur because (i) the initial urban giants become highly congested and (ii)
the mechanism of factor price equalization should proceed (Williamson, 1965;
Alonso, 1980; Wheaton and Shishido, 1981). Hence, our results above pro-
vide a formal proof of the existence of such ∩-shaped relationships between
economic development and the spatial distribution of activities, as well as
between economic development and the interregional wage diﬀerential.
5Eﬃciency vs. regional equity
Since preferences are quasi-linear and proﬁts are zero, we may evaluate ef-
ﬁciency by using the sumof individual welfare across workers and farm ers.
In the homogenous case, the consumer surplus is simply given by the sum of
indirect utilities over the two regions. However, once we introduce hetero-
geneity across workers, we must account for the fact that they now beneﬁt
from intrinsic diﬀerentiation between regions. To do so, we use Proposition
3.7 by Anderson et al. (1992), which gives us the utility level of a worker as
a function of λ:
V0(PH)=PHVH (λ)+PFVF (λ) − µ(PH logPH + PF logPF)
where the ﬁrst two terms stands for the expected utility derived from liv-
ing in region r with probability Pr, whereas the last termcorresponds to a
“premium” associated with the presence of heterogeneity (observe that the
terms in parentheses are negative). Since the probability PH is the same for
all workers, it must be that PH = λ and PF =1− λ. This in turn implies
that the maximum utility level of a worker may be rewritten as follows:4
V(λ)=λVH (λ)+( 1 −λ)VF (λ) − µ[λlogλ +( 1 −λ)log(1−λ)] (14)
4Equation (14) can also be derived from the maximization of the following individual
welfare (see, e.g. Small and Rosen, 1981):
V(λ)=µlog{exp[VH(λ)/µ] + exp[VF(λ)/µ]}
through interregional income transfers, Subject to the equilibrium condition (1− λ)PH =
λPF.





The ﬁrst best outcome may then be obtained by maximizing W(λ) with
respect to λ, all prices being set equal to marginal costs (prr = 0 and prs = τ).
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The optimality condition (16) is therefore similar to the equilibrium condition
(9) except for the parameters Co and τo. As a result, (16) has exactly one
interior solution in the interval of [1/2,1), which is a local maximizer of (15).
Moreover, since d ≥ 0, it is readily veriﬁed that
W(1/2+x) ≥ W(1/2 − x) ∀x ∈ [0,1/2]
W
 (1/2) ≥ 0 ∀τ ∈ [0,τ trade]
Thus, the social optimum λo is uniquely determined in the interval of [1/2,1)
(up to a permutation in the special case where d = 0).
5.1 The case of asymmetric regions
When d>0, the eﬃcient fraction of workers in region H must be such that
λ
o > 1/2 ∀τ ∈ (0,τ trade]
thus implying partial agglomeration in region H for any τ. As expected,
the existence of an amenity diﬀerential is suﬃcient to prevent the symmet-
ric conﬁguration frombeing eﬃcient. In addition, it is readily shown that
W  (0) = ∞ and W  (1) = −∞. Hence, the maximizer is necessarily interior.
Put diﬀerently, even when the amenity diﬀerential d is very large, full ag-







o/2 − τ)(λ − 1/2)
Summarizing the above, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 Assume that both regions are asymmetric (d>0) and that
workers are heterogenous (µ>0). Then, the eﬃcient size of region H is
larger than that of region F for all admissible τ. When τ steadily decreases,
the eﬃcient size of region H grows, without reaching the value 1, as long as
τ>τ o/2 and declines for τ<τ o/2.
Clearly, both Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 are similar but, as illus-
trated in Figure 3, the two patterns are not necessarily identical. The maxi-
mum size arises at τo/2 in the eﬃciency case and at τ∗/2 in the equilibrium
case with τo/2 <τ ∗/2.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Next, we compare the equilibrium and eﬃcient distributions. From the
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λ∗ >λ o must hold for B>0. This occurs for high degree of product
diﬀerentiation (1/c) and high ﬁxed costs (φ). Hence, we have:
Proposition 4 (i) When varieties are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and increas-
ing returns are suﬃciently high (B>0), the equilibrium conﬁguration is more
concentrated than the optimal one for all admissible τ.
(ii) When varieties are close substitutes and/or increasing returns are
suﬃciently low (B<0), the equilibrium conﬁguration is less concentrated
than the optimal one for τ ∈ (τc,τ trade] but more concentrated for τ ∈ (0,τc).
19Both cases (i) and (ii) are illustrated in Figure 3 where the dotted curve
shows the optimum, and the heavy ones the stable equilibria. It is worth
noting that the parameters τc,τ∗,τo and B are independent of µ, while the
distributions λ∗ and λo depend on the degree of heterogeneity µ. In modern
economies, the degree of the product diﬀerentiation and the degree of scale
economies tend to be large, whereas trade costs tend to be low. Thus, it
seems fair to conclude that, in our economies, the market outcome is likely
to involve too much agglomeration.
Finally, since ∆V (λ) > 0 holds for all λ ≥ 1/2 and d>0, the welfare of
farmers residing in region H is always higher than that of farmers living in
F. This leads us to focus on an alternative social welfare function that has
retained a lot of attention in regional planning, namely spatial equity. This




given that the prices are set equal to marginal costs. Since ∆V (λ) > 0 holds
for any parameter values with λ ≥ 1/2, we know that (17) is maximized at
λR < 1/2. When the social objective is to maximize a Rawlsian welfare func-
tion, there must be more workers in the region with less amenities. Such a
result is a sharp contrast to what we obtained above in the eﬃciency case. In
a sense, the implementation of interregional income transfers, which are car-
ried out in several industrialized countries, may be considered as an attempt
at providing some reconciliation between eﬃciency and spatial equity.
5.2 The case of symmetric regions
When d = 0, we always have
W
 (1/2) = 0
Solving the quadratic equation W   (1/2) = 0 with respect to τ, we obtain
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20Hence, when taste heterogeneity is suﬃciently broad, dispersion is always
socially eﬃcient. In other words, µo is the symmetry breaking threshold in
the eﬃciency case. As in the equilibriumcase, it is easy to see that µo =0
when φ = 0. Thus, we need increasing returns for partial agglomeration to
be socially eﬃcient.
It is readily veriﬁed that W(λ) reaches a local maximum (minimum) at
1/2 if and only if τ>τ o




shown in the previous subsection, there is a unique local maximum (up to a
permutation) diﬀerent from 1/2 when τo
1 <τ<τ o
2. We may then establish
Proposition 5 for the eﬃciency case in the same way we did for Proposition
2, by replacing the superscript ∗ by o.
Proposition 5 Consider two symmetric regions (d =0 ) and let the trade
costs to decrease steadily.
(i) Assume that 0 <µ<µ o. When τ ≥ τo
2, the eﬃcient conﬁguration
involves full dispersion of the industry. When τo
2 >τ>τ o
1, the industry is
partial agglomerated. For τo
2 >τ>τ o/2 the gap between the two regions
widens, but narrows for τo/2 >τ>τ o
1. Finally, when τ ≤ τo
1, the optimum
is again fully dispersed.
(ii) Assume that µ ≥ µo. The optimum involves full dispersion for all
admissible τ.
The eﬃcient conﬁguration in case (i) as a function of τ is qualitatively
similar to the one displayed in Figure 2. Unfortunately, the comparison
between the various distributions in case (ii) is not straightforward. Yet, we
know that both (τo
1 + τo





As a result, both the market equilibrium and the eﬃcient outcome involve
symmetry for suﬃciently large degrees of heterogeneity µ (case (ii)) or for
suﬃciently low trade costs τ (case (i)). Otherwise, the market outcome is
more dispersed or more agglomerated than the optimum, depending on the
parameter values.
Finally, as expected, maximizing the Rawlsian welfare function (17) al-
ways yields full dispersion in the case of symmetric regions.
6 Concluding remarks
We have shown that taste heterogeneity is a strong dispersion force that dra-
matically aﬀects the core-periphery structure. Typically, it gives rise to a
21∩-shaped relationship between the spatial concentration of industry and the
level of trade costs. In our setting, the dispersed equilibriumis generally
asymmetric and the region with the high level of amenity is larger than the
other one. In addition, the evolution of the equilibriumpattern of the indus-
trial sector no longer involves a catastrophic change. As a consequence, the
global economy would follow a three-stage process, involving dispersion, ag-
glomeration, and re-dispersion, which is continuous with respect to variations
in the trade cost.
In the introduction, we have argued that welfare diﬀerentials based on
market consumption goods and wages have decreased across industrial re-
gions as economic development has proceeded. This implies that nonmarket
factors, such as the attachment of people to their region of origin or the
presence of speciﬁc amenities, have a growing importance in individual de-
cisions to migrate (formally, the values of µ and d rise). Indeed, once they
have reached some living thresholds, workers are less willing to trade their
family and social environment against more individual consumption. This is
especially well illustrated by the fact that, within the European Union, tra-
ditional migration ﬂows such as those from Southern to Northern Italy have
stopped during the last decades. By contrast, there has been an increase in
the mobility of high skilled workers within the European Union and Japan.
This can be explained by the following two factors. First, education gener-
ates human capital which is easily transferable to another region and eases
the search for job, residency and a social environment to live in. In other
words, the marginal rate of substitution between the social environment and
individual consumption would be larger for the skilled than for the unskilled
(in our setting, the skilled would have a lower µ than the unskilled). Sec-
ond, regional wage diﬀerentials are likely to be larger for the skilled than for
the unskilled (Black, 2000). These two forces put together make migration
more attractive for the former than for the latter. All of this then suggests
an explanation for the fundamental changes observed in migration patterns
within post-industrial economic areas such as the European Union or Japan.
By the same token, this would provide us with an explanation for the rising
concentration of high-level services within large metropolitan regions (Amiti,
1998; Fujita and Tabuchi, 1997).
To sum-up, this paper has shown that taste heterogeneity is likely to be
a critical force in shaping modern economic spaces. Thus, omitting it in our
analyses might lead to rough and incomplete pictures.
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25Proof of Lemma 1
Consider ﬁrst λ ∈ [1/2,1], which corresponds to case (i) and the ﬁrst part







(1 − λ)2 (18)
it follows that J(λ,τ) is concave with respect to λ for all λ ∈ (1/2,1). Hence,
there is exactly one equilibrium λ∗
3 in the interval (1/2,1). Furthermore, it
is stable since ∂J(λ∗
3,τ)/∂λ < 0.
Next, consider λ ∈ [0,1/2), which is the second part of case (ii). Since









Since the ﬁrst term is maximized at τ = τ∗/2, and the second termis m ini-
mized at λ =1 /2, multiple equilibria are possible only if ∂J(1/2,τ∗/2)/∂λ >
0 holds, which is (10).
Since limλ→0 J(λ,τ∗/2) > 0 and J(1/2,τ∗/2) > 0, multiple equilibria
arise only if J( λ(τ∗/2),τ∗/2) ≤ 0. From(18), J(λ,τ) is convex with respect
to λ for all λ ∈ (0,1/2). Hence, there exist two equilibria, denoted by λ∗
1 and
λ∗
2 with 0 <λ ∗
1 ≤ λ∗
2 < 1/2, if J( λ(τ∗/2),τ∗/2) ≤ 0.
When J( λ(τ∗/2),τ∗/2) = 0, the repeated root  λ(τ∗/2) is an unstable
equilibriumsince ∂J( λ(τ∗/2),τ∗/2)/∂λ = 0 and ∂2J( λ(τ∗/2),τ∗/2)/∂λ2 > 0.
Therefore, (11) is necessary for the equilibriumto be stable.




b ) = 0), the repeated root
 λ(τ∗
a)(  λ(τ∗
b )) is also an unstable equilibrium. Hence, two distinct equilibria
exist in the interval (0,1/2) only if τ ∈ (τ∗
a,τ∗
b ) under (10) and (11), where
λ∗
1 is stable and λ∗






Figure  1  Equilibrium  when  d > 0 
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Figure  2  Equilibrium  when  d = 0 
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Figure 3(i)    Equilibrium and social optimum when d > 0 and B > 0 
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Figure 3(ii)    Equilibrium and social optimum when d > 0 and B < 0 
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